Hi Richard: I'm pleased to see that HS(G) 48 is still free of charge at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg48.htm . Sadly IEC62508 "Human Reliability" (which is also very useful) is over $400. I've recommended both to people on the ISO45001 Masterclasses when talking about clause 6.1.2 (risk assessments) and the definition of hazard in the HSWA2015. The Act strongly implies we must include human factors when considering if risk has been minimised SFAIRP.

The subject of high-vis PPE came up a few years ago in the old forum and prompted me to research some of the background material, but not this specific question.
There is an ISO standard (which I don't have) that says in the scope:
"ISO 20471:2013 specifies requirements for high visibility clothing which is capable of visually signalling the user's presence. The high visibility clothing is intended to provide conspicuity of the wearer in any light condition when viewed by operators of vehicles or other mechanized equipment during daylight conditions and under illumination of headlights in the dark.
Performance requirements are included for colour and retroreflection as well as for the minimum areas and for the placement of the materials in protective clothing".
Based on that I would agree that any high-vis gear that has become scruffy should be replaced.

Hi Auriette
I've only just picked up your message.
Yes, I'm in Invercargill on Wednesday and there are spaces available on the course. If you phone me on 0274713723 before 1500 on Sunday 26th I can bring extra course handbooks and sort out billing you.
Chris

The trouble is, most people have failed to grasp the implications of "reasonably practicable" and they therefore stop any investigation with the convenient post-event attribution "human error".
Perhaps we should start with the premise that an unintended action of one component (a human being) of a system is known to be error-prone and such errors can cause severe consequences. We could then ask if any risk treatments are practicable (ie, "capable of being done") that would minimise risk ("effect of uncertainty on objectives" in ISO31000). Those treatments might start with redesign of the overall system or components of the system. The cost of any treatments that are found to be practicable can then be calculated (along with any additional benefits they may offer) to ascertain if they would be reasonable.
From a quality management point of view, repeated failures to achieve the requirements for product safety, quality, etc would result in quality improvement. Why not for OHS?
There is research evidence that organisations with an ISO9001 quality management system find it easier to introduce an OHS management system. I have been arguing in the current NZISM ISO45001 Masterclasses that the structure of management system standards provides OHS practitioners/professionals with an opportunity to introduce integrated HS/Q or HSEQ management systems with economic benefits for their PCBUs.
And to reduce "human error" and injuries.

I've not yet seen the article but, having represented NZISM on p45001, can respond to some of Dianne's comments.
AS/NZS4801 has not been reviewed or revised since 2001. It should have been in the roughly five yearly cycle of review/revision but escaped the attention of Standards Australia and Standards NZ. When ISO45001 has been adopted it is likely that Standards Australia and Standards NZ will ask what should happen to AS/NZS4801. Based on experience with other joint adoptions they will be asked to withdraw AS/NZS4801. BSI, ILO and other "owners" of OHSMS standards have indicated the same will happen to their standards, leaving us with an internationally written and jointly adopted standard with a review/revision cycle.
AS/NZS4801 (also an industry based standard) obviously was not developed by ISO using Annex SL as the framework and is not a management system standard (MSS) as defined by ISO. The gaps are especially evident in ISO45001 clause 4 - there is no equivalent in AS/NZS4801.
Even a cursory reading of ISO45001 and (say) ISO9001 shows their relationship and the opportunities for OHS practitioners/professionals to integrate an ISO45001 OHSMS seamlessly with other ISO MSS to the benefit of their organisation (less paperwork, etc).
ISO45001 was developed in a multi-party process that included unions, employers, OHS organisations (including IOSH) and others.
Nobody is required to implement it but, based on the Masterclasses I am running for NZISM, several hundred NZISM members have it in their medium to long term plans. The Masterclasses include how to include a gap analysis to help attendees see the big picture and not work inside an OHS silo.

I think Jan has also been reading Sydney Dekker's book where he advocates putting "human error" in quote marks because it is an attribution we use after the event!
"Human error" is a cop out for a PCBU that failed to think about the human factors, the performance-shaping factors, that might contribute to some variation from the intended outcome.
The trouble is that almost nobody is trained in human factors or dealing with the performance-shaping factors. And too many HSPs are in that category.
By the way, how many readers own a copy of IEC62508:2015 "Human aspects of dependability"?

Which SMS is the CAA talking about? I can't think of any SMS that doesn't refer to health. And if NZ aviation businesses decide to use ISO45001 they will have to include health (see clause 6.1.2.1) - or explicitly say it has been excluded. That will then lead to the need to explain and justify the exclusion.
Health is surely an operational matter.
I look forward to talking to CAA people in one of the NZISM Masterclasses on ISO45001!
I think that all the major SMS in current use are likely to be withdrawn now that ISO45001 has been published. Standards Australia has already flagged AS/NZS4801 as an "aged standard" for withdrawal. The ILO had a major hand in developing ISO45001 so its standard document will go. Similarly, OHSAS and others.
Plus ISO45001 is in the ISO "family" of management system standards so it is very compatible with ISO9001 (surely the basis of best practice in running an aviation business?).

Yes.
I merged a diagram from each to summarise aspects of both documents and it shows nicely how the job, organisation and individual worker can interact to result in poor outcomes.

Thank you, helpful comments

These are surely performance shaping factors. See the HSE guide "Reducing error and influencing behaviour"and the IEC standard 62508 "Human aspects of dependability". They directly affect the individual workers, the job and the organisation.

Try the joint/international standard AS/NZS ISO 4024.3610:2015. Safety of machinery - Conveyors - General requirements from Standards New Zealand. It:
"Provides guidance and clarity in applying the principles articulated in the AS/NZS 4024 series of standards to conveyors. It sets out the minimum lifecycle safety requirements for conveyor systems and is intended to be used in conjunction with other conveyor Standards in the AS 4024 series by all persons that design/modify, manufacture, supply, install, commission, operate, maintain or dismantle conveyor systems. The objective is to protect workers and other persons against harm to their health, safety and welfare through the elimination or minimization of lifecycle risks associated with conveyor systems."
There are other parts to the standard that give more detailed guidance.